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Dizionario gramsciano / Gramsci Dictionary: Collective Will
Abstract
This is a translation into English of the Dizionario gramsciano entry ‘Collective Will” by Carlos Nelson
Coutinho. The concept of and need for the creation of a collective will, sometimes qualified as ‘nationalpopular collective will’, finds its most extensive development in a second draft text of Notebook 14. As
such it is determining in the formation of social reality and, indeed, of democracy in Gramsci’s sense of
rule by the people. The emphasis placed on a collective will, ‘attained through concrete individual effort’,
forms part of Gramsci’s critique of the ‘positivist and naturalist encrustations’ of the determinist forms of
Marxism, both of the Second International and those expressed notably at the time by Bukharin in the
Soviet Union and is a factor in Gramsci’s formulation of his ‘philosophy of praxis’. The expression of this
collective will is intimately linked to another Gramscian concept, that of the ‘modern Prince’ which
becomes the ‘protagonist of a real and effective historical drama’, the aim in which is to reach concrete
and rational goals: expressed otherwise it plays a key role in the struggle to create a new hegemony, an
‘intellectual and moral reform’, and a genuine democracy, one of whose expressions is the ‘legislator’,
understood as a person expressing a ‘specific collective will’ and attempting through that ‘to modify
reality according to certain directive lines’. In conclusion the formation of such a collective will is
essential in overcoming the direction-spontaneity (elsewhere ‘leaders-led’) dichotomy. (Note: Abstract
written by the editors).
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Collective Will / Volontà collettiva:
Gramsci Dictionary
Carlos Nelson Coutinho
From his early years onward Gramsci emphasized the central
role of will in the construction of a social and political order. In a
celebrated article written in December 1917, after having defined
the soviet Revolution as a ‘revolution against Capital’, in which he
asserted that the Bolsheviks had overcome the ‘positivist and
naturalist encrustations’ claimed to be present even in Marx,
Gramsci wrote that the most important factors in history are not
‘raw economic facts, but man, men in societies, men in relation to
one another, developing through these contacts (civilization), a
collective, social will: men coming to understand economic facts,
judging them and adapting them to their will until this becomes the
driving force of the economy and moulds objective reality, which
lives and moves and comes to resemble a current of volcanic lava
that can be channelled wherever and in whatever way men’s will
determines’ (Gramsci, 1982, p. 514; in English, 1977, pp. 34-5).1
This idea of a ‘collective, social will’ that comes as a result of the
contacts between people, and which has a determining role in the
creation of social reality – even if directly influenced by the neoidealism of Croce and above all Gentile – is very similar to the
contractualism of Rousseau. It is however true that, with this
voluntaristic position, Gramsci was reacting against the ‘positivist
and naturalist encrustations’ that marked the position not of Marx’s
thought, as he then supposed, but certainly the Marxism of the
Second International.
If Gramsci had kept faith with this ‘omnipotence’ of the will, he
would not have gone beyond the neo-idealism that was indebted
not so much to the objective dialectic of Hegel as to the subjective
dialectic of Fichte. In his mature thought, i.e. in the Notebooks,
Gramsci completed his assimilation of historical materialism, which
he would later designate the philosophy of praxis. As a result of this
1 Hereafter we include reference to English translations after the principal reference to the
Gerratana 1975 critical edition (trans. note).
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theoretical conquest, he was able to deal with the concept of
collective will – which remained central to his reflections – at a
different level of concreteness. Now the teleological moment of
human action appears as organically articulated with the causalgenetic moment. Collective will continues to play an important role
in the construction of the social order, no longer as moulding
reality but as a decisive moment that is articulated with the
determinations that stem from objective reality, in particular from
the social relations of production.
In the Notebooks the concept of collective will (sometimes found
requalified as ‘national-popular collective will’) finds its most
extensive treatment in the long first paragraph of Notebook 13
(Gramsci, 1975, Q13§1, pp. 1555-61; 1971, pp. 125-33), which is
Gramsci’s rewrite, without substantial alteration,2 of Q8§21 (1975,
pp. 851-3; 2007, pp. 246-9). In analysing the role of the modern
Prince (that is of the revolutionary political party) in the
construction of the national-popular collective will, in other words
of a new hegemony, Gramsci brings out – as he had not done in his
early writings – the twofold determination of will. On the one hand,
he emphasizes the active role of will, thereby distancing himself
from those who, following in Hegel’s footsteps, understand
collective will as some-thing that imposes itself objectively,
‘spontaneously’. It seems to me that it is here that one finds the nub
of Gramsci’s critique of Sorel and his conception of the ‘myth’.
Gramsci says, in effect, that ‘It is true that for Sorel the “myth”
found its fullest expression not in the trade union as organisation of
a collective will, but in its practical action – sign of a collective will
already operative. The highest achievement of this practical action
was to have been the general strike – i.e. a “passive activity” , so to
speak, of a negative and preliminary kind […] an activity which does not
envisage an “active and constructive” phase of its own. […] The outcome
was left to the intervention of the irrational, to chance (in the Bergsonian sense of “elan vital”) or to “ spontaneity”’ (Gramsci, 1975,
pp. 1556-7; 1971, p. 127: emphasis added – C.N.C). Gramsci goes
on to say that ‘In Sorel’s case it is clear that behind the spontaneity
there lies a purely mechanistic3 assumption, behind the liberty (will–
2 Where deemed necessary, there is however a requalification of ‘collective will’ in the first
draft as ‘national-popular collective will’ in the rewritten text (trans. note).
3 This word may also be rendered, more literally, as ‘mechanicist’, which Hoare and NowellSmith choose in the passage below from Q11§59 (trans. note).
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life-force) a maximum of determinism, behind the idealism an
absolute materialism’ (Gramsci, 1975, p. 1558; 1971, p. 129).
The role of the ‘modern Prince’ is instead that of actively constructing a new collective will: in consequence Gramsci’s critique is
not only of Sorel but all those who do not see ‘that a new collective
will must be created from scratch, to be directed towards goals
which are concrete and rational, but whose concreteness and
rationality have not yet been put to the critical test by a real and
universally known historical experience’ (Gramsci, 1975, p. 1558;
1971, p. 130). On the other hand, already in this passage Gramsci
draws attention to the fact that the goals must be concrete and
rational, in other words must be teleologically planned starting from
and taking into consideration the causal conditions objectively
posed by historical reality. Such is what it seems to me is contained
in the following words: ‘The modern Prince must have a part
devoted to Jacobinism (in the integral sense which this notion has
had historically, and must have conceptually), as an exemplification
of the concrete formation and operation of a collective will which
at least in some aspects was an original, ex novo creation. And a definition must be given of collective will, and of political will in general,
in the modem sense: will as operative awareness of historical necessity, as
protagonist of a real and effective historical drama (Gramsci, 1975,
p. 1559; 1971, p. 130: emphasis added – C.N.C.). It is therefore
only for ‘some aspects’ that the collective will is the ‘operative
awareness of historical necessity’ (loc. cit.). We see here the dialectical articulation between teleology and causality, between the subjective and objective moments of human praxis, of which will is the
ineliminable moment. The collective will that becomes the ‘protagonist of a real and effective historical drama’ (loc. cit.) – in other
words becomes an epistemologically constitutive moment of social
reality – is the one marked by this two-fold determination.
This conception of will, now formulated at a more purely philosophical level, appears in a still clearer way in another context,
where Gramsci deals with the question of ‘what is philosophy?’. He
says ‘To escape simultaneously from solipsism and from mechanicist
conceptions implicit in the concept of thought as a receptive and
ordering activity, it is necessary to put the question in an “historicist” fashion, and at the same time to put the “will” (which in the
last analysis equals practical or political activity) at the base of philo-
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sophy. But it must be a rational, not an arbitrary, will, which is realised in so
far as it corresponds to objective historical necessities, or in so far as it is universal history itself in the moment of its progressive actualisation.
Should this will be represented at the beginning by a single individual, its rationality will be documented by the fact that it comes to
be accepted by the many, and accepted permanently: that is, by
becoming a culture, a form of “ good sense” , a conception of the
world with an ethic that conforms to its structure’ (Gramsci, 1975,
Q11§59, p. 1485; 1971, pp. 345-6: emphasis added – C.N.C.).
Gramsci proposes here a conception of will, otherwise identified in
the last analysis with political praxis, capable of going beyond both
solipsistic idealism and vulgar mechanicist materialism, which see
only subjective determinism, and the objective determinism of the
will, respectively.
It should be remarked that in the common context given by this
dialectical articulation of teleology and causality, Gramsci conceives
of different historical manifestations of collective will. The one on
which he insists more strongly is that of the collective will as an
element of democracy. Speaking of the differentiation between the
historical evolution of Italy and France, when for the first time he
uses ‘collective will’ in the Notebooks, Gramsci observes that ‘the
beginning of the divergence between Italian and French history can
be witnessed in the Strasbourg oath (about 841),4 namely in the fact
that the people (the people-army) participated actively in history by
becoming guarantors of the observance of the treaties between the
descendants of Charlemagne. The people-army gave its guarantee
by “swearing in the vernacular”; in other words, the people introduced their language into the history of the nation, assuming a
political function of the highest importance, presenting themselves as a
collective will, as a component of a national democracy’ (Gramsci, 1975,
Q5§123, p. 646; 1996, p. 367: emphasis added – C.N.C.). The
negative side of this relation between collective will and democracy
is, as Gramsci notes, that the absence of such a will leads to a
bureaucratic despotism. In the ‘absence of a real democracy, of a
real national collective will, and hence, because of this passivity of
individuals, the need for a more or less disguised despotism of the

4 The ‘first time’, apart that is, apart from a use in Q3§87, predating the paragraph cited here by
about half a year; the oath referred to was actually sworn on 14 February 842 (editorial note).
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bureaucracy is shown.5 The collectivity must be understood as the
product of painstaking will and collective thought attained through
concrete individual effort and not through a reliance on a process
of destiny that is extraneous to the individual, hence the need for
inner discipline, not just external and mechanical discipline’
(Gramsci, 1975, Q6§79, pp. 750-51; 2007, p. 63). But the formation
of a collective will can also originate from the action of a charismatic leader; in this case however, this collective will – if one can
attest to its existence – is fragile. In criticizing the theory of the
charismatic leader in Weber and above all in Michels, Gramsci
writes: ‘But did collective man exist in the past? He existed, as
Michels would say, under the form of charismatic leadership. In
other words, a collective will was obtained under the impetus and
direct influence of a “hero”, of a paradigmatic individual, but this
collective will was promoted by extraneous factors, and once formed would
disintegrate, repeatedly (Gramsci, 1975, Q7§12, p. 862; 2007, p. 165
and also 1995, p. 276: emphasis added – C.N.C.).
Collective will in Gramsci also appears together with the traditional concept of sovereignty or, more precisely, it is posed as the
basis for the action of the legislator. In effect, in Q14§9 (Gramsci,
1975, p. 1663),6 after having claimed ‘1) that the individual legislator
(and individual legislator must be understood not only in the
restricted case of parliamentary State activity but also in every other
“individual” activity that attempts, in greater or lesser spheres of
social life, to modify reality according to certain directive lines), that
these individual legislators cannot but undertake “arbitrary”, antihistorical actions since, once their act of initiative has been put into
practice, that act functions as a force in itself in the given social
circle, thereby giving rise to actions and reactions that are intrinsic
to this circle, beyond the act in itself; 2) that every act, legislative or
of directive or normative will, must also and especially be judged
objectively for the effective consequences that it may have’.
Gramsci concludes (loc. cit): ‘3) that all legislators cannot but be
abstractly and by convenience of language considered as individuals
since in reality they express a specific collective will such as to
render effective their “will”, which is will only in so far as the
5

The last two words were added editorially in Gramsci (1975) to complete the syntax (trans.
note).
6 Not yet contained in a standard English translation (trans. note).
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collectivity is disposed to put it into effect; 4) that therefore all
individuals who differentiate themselves from a collective will and
do not attempt to create, give rise to, extend, reinforce, organize it,
are simply coachman-flies,7 “disarmed prophets”, will-o’-the-wisps’.
Finally, in Gramsci the concept of collective will is closely bound
up with that of ‘intellectual and moral reform’, in other words with
the question of hegemony. In effect, an important task of the ‘modern Prince’ is indeed that of being the ‘promoter of intellectual and
moral reform, which constitutes the terrain for a subsequent development of the national-popular collective will8 rooted in a complete
and accomplished form of modern civilization. In the end the modern Prince should focus entirely on these two basic points: the formation of a national-popular collective will, of which the modern
Prince is the active and operative expression, and intellectual and
moral reform’ (Gramsci, 1975, Q8§2, p. 953; 2007, pp. 248-9).
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